Money

Wawa, Kyle, Thriller and I took the dogs, Dana, Sam and Murphy, to the dog park in Raleigh this afternoon where we met this really nice elderly gentleman from upstate New York who had also brought his dog, Sandy. In discussion, as the dogs romped through the trees, we learned he was a retired Marine and Korean War Veteran, now with all the ailments one might expect of an 80-year-old man. He mentioned on and off for an hour and a half about the best place to obtain Veterans Administration medical benefits. And, there I was thinking, "Damn, we are still paying for the Korean War fought over 50 years ago to a standstill yet unsettled." Indeed, of the 5.7M soldiers involved in Korea, 2.9M are still alive and eligible for VA benefits. The cost of war does not stop when the shooting does.

So just how much does a war cost? Well, the easy part is the direct military expenditures for guns and bombs and uniforms and soldier's pay and such like. In dollars adjusted for inflation:

WW-I: $0.2T

WW-II: $3.1T

Korea: $0.4T

Vietnam: $0.5T

Afghanistan/Iraq: $0.8T and counting

Yup, the conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq is already our second most expensive war ... ever. And we ain't done yet for we are still shooting.

And, of course, we'll be paying the indirect costs of replacement leg prosthesis for all those 20 year olds who lost them to roadside bombs for the next three-quarters century.

Now, if we look at the direct cost of war per active serviceman during wartime, we find the follow direct expenditures:

WW-I: $42M

WW-II: $190M

Korea: $70M

Vietnam: $60M

Afghanistan/Iraq: $620M

Remember, folks, inflation has already been factored out of these figures. These are on a dollar for dollar basis.

Just why are the direct cost of the Afghanistan/Iraq War so huge ($0.6B per US soldier whether stationed in Iraq or not) in comparison to other wars? The answer, quite simply, is, in a word, privatization. Chores formerly done by the military are now being farmed out to for-profit companies.

On April 23 of this year, the Comptroller General of the United States, David M. Walker, issued a report to the Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives entitled "Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq - Conditions in Iraq are Conducive to Fraud, Waste and Abuse". From the report:

DOD’s heavy reliance on contractors in Iraq, its long-standing contract and contract management problems, and poor security conditions provide opportunities for fraud, waste, and abuse. First, military commanders and senior DOD leaders do not have visibility over the total number of contractors who are supporting deployed forces in Iraq. As we have noted in the past, this limited visibility can unnecessarily increase costs to the government. For example, at a contractor accountability task force meeting we attended in 2006, an official from the Army Material Command noted that an Army official estimated that about $43 million is lost every year on free meals provided to contractor employees who also receive per
diem. Second, DOD lacks clear and comprehensive guidance and leadership for managing and overseeing contractors. In October 2005, DOD issued, for the first time, department-wide guidance on the use of contractors that support deployed forces. Although this guidance is a good first step, it does not address a number of problems we have repeatedly raised. In October 2006, DOD established the office of the raised. In October 2006, DOD established the office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Program Support to serve as the office with primary responsibility for contractor support issues. However, as we noted in our December 2006 report, it is not clear to what extent this office serves as the focal point dedicated to leading DOD’s efforts to improve its contract management and oversight. Third, key contracting issues have prevented DOD from achieving successful acquisition outcomes. There has been an absence of well-defined requirements, and DOD has often entered into contract arrangements on reconstruction efforts and into contracts to support deployed forces that have posed additional risk to the government. Moreover, DOD does not have a sufficient number of oversight personnel, which precludes its ability to obtain reasonable assurance that contractors are meeting contract requirements efficiently and effectively at each location where work is being performed. Further, a lack of training hinders the ability of military commanders to adequately plan for the use of contractor support and inhibits the ability of contract oversight personnel to manage and oversee contracts and contractors in Iraq. to serve as the office with primary responsibility for contractor support issues. However, as we noted in our December 2006 report, it is not clear to what extent this office serves as the focal point dedicated to leading DOD’s efforts to improve its contract management and oversight. Third, key contracting issues have prevented DOD from achieving successful acquisition outcomes. There has been an absence of well-defined requirements, and DOD has often entered into contract arrangements on reconstruction efforts and into contracts to support deployed forces that have posed additional risk to the government. Moreover, DOD does not have a sufficient number of oversight personnel, which precludes its ability to obtain reasonable assurance that contractors are meeting contract requirements efficiently and effectively at each location where work is being performed. Further, a lack of training hinders the ability of military commanders to adequately plan for the use of contractor support and inhibits the ability of contract oversight personnel to manage and oversee contracts and contractors in Iraq.

And, this is from the Executive Branch of government, the one headed up by Dubya, The Decider! Were this report by the comptroller of any one of these contractors to its management, heads would be rolling down the hallways in streams of blood.

Anyhow, as of April 4 of this year, private contractors paid by US firms -- some 180,000+ people -- outnumber the US military forces in Iraq. And, just how much do we pay for these folks?

Well, a security guard for a food convoy gets paid $600 a day. His employer, Blackwater USA, adds on another $215 in overhead a day. Blackwater sells their services to Regency Hotel, a Kuwaiti middleman who adds overhead, who is hired by ESS, a German food contractor who adds overhead, who is hired by Halliburton, the Texas general contractor run by Vice-President Cheney before he was picked by Dubya as a running partner, who adds overhead, who is, finally, hired by the Department of Defence to provide the food being delivered by the convoy.

And, just how much does this one security guard ultimately cost the US taxpayer after each for-profit takes their slice of the taxpayer's pie?

You will never know, except that it is a part of the total, $800B+ and growing.